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DOE V. UNOCAL:
HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ON THEIR
WATCH
Armin Rosencranz*
David Louk**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty-five years, the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), a little known provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, has
become a leading tool for pursuing human rights abusers in U.S.
courts.1 Allowing foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for customary
international law violations committed abroad, the ATCA seems
to enable victims of human rights abuses to sue both individuals
and corporations.2 After an eight year legal battle, the plaintiffs
in the most notable ATCA case against a corporation, Doe v.
Unocal, recently settled with Unocal out of court for an
undisclosed sum just prior to a jury being empanelled in a
California state case that paralleled the federal ATCA-based
case.3
As Unocal advanced through both the federal and state court
proceedings, the judges upheld the plaintiffs on many of their
motions.4 Notwithstanding the settlement, the United States
*Armin Rosencranz (A.B., Princeton; J.D., Ph.D., Stanford) is a consulting professor at
Stanford.
**David Louk, a Stanford student, took Professor Rosencranz’ 2003 seminar on the Alien
Tort Claims Act of 1789.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”). The Alien Tort Claims Act is also often referred to as the
Alien Tort Statute. See, e.g., LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 70-71
(1996).
2 See Terese M. O’Toole, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: An
Alien Tort Statute Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 72 MINN. L. REV. 829, 839
(1988).
3 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), district court opinion vacated by 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
Unocal III].
4 See Unocal v. Super. Ct., No. S114884, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 3270 (Cal. May 14, 2003);
Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal I]; Doe v. Unocal,
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding the
ATCA’s reach has given human rights activists reason to believe
that, in certain instances, the ATCA grants the federal
jurisdiction necessary to hold corporations liable for human
rights offenses that corporations commit or contribute to abroad.5
II. DOE V. UNOCAL: U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
The case of Doe v. Unocal involved the construction of the
Yadana pipeline in Burma.6 The plaintiffs, villagers from the
Tenasserim region of Burma, sued Unocal for its complicity in
human rights atrocities committed by the Burmese government
and military during the construction of the pipeline.7 The
plaintiffs claimed that Unocal, through the Burmese military,
intelligence and/or police forces, used violence and intimidation
to relocate whole villages, enslave villagers living in the area of
the pipeline, steal property, and commit assault, rape, torture,
forced labor, and murder.8
The plaintiffs’ lawsuit first came before Judge Richard Paez
of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California in 1996 (Unocal I).9 In Unocal I, Judge Paez’ role was
to determine whether the plaintiffs had shown sufficient
evidence to survive Unocal’s motion to dismiss under Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).10 The Unocal I
lawsuit included Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as
110 F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Unocal II]; Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932.
5 See Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932.
6 Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85.
7 Id. Since 1988, the military junta in Burma has promoted the name of the state
as Myanmar. Id. at 884. The U.S. continues to refer to the state as Burma. Although
referenced as Burma in this document, both names are used throughout the Doe v. Unocal
lawsuits.
8 Id. at 883.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 884. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a person is
a necessary party if:
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so
joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action
improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
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defendants in the case.11 Due to immunities granted by the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act,12 Judge Paez found that
MOGE and SLORC, entities controlled by the Burmese
They were
government, were immune from prosecution.13
dropped as co-defendants in the case.14
In its motion to dismiss, Unocal argued that under FRCP
Rule 19, SLORC and MOGE were required parties in the
Judge Paez disagreed: because plaintiffs were
lawsuit.15
claiming Unocal was liable as a joint tortfeasor, compensatory
relief could be accorded, even if SLORC and MOGE were not
defendants.16 Because plaintiffs were seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief, the case went forward without MOGE or
Judge Paez’ ruling was
SLORC as named defendants.17
significant in that it allowed the plaintiffs to seek damages from
a U.S. corporation, even if it was only one of several named
responsible parties for a violation of the ATCA. In addition, he
recognized that corporations are viable defendants for plaintiffs
claiming an ATCA violation.18
III. DOE V. UNOCAL: U.S. DISTRICT COURT, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Unocal then moved for summary judgment on all of the
plaintiffs’ claims before U.S. District Judge Ronald Lew.19 In
arguing for summary judgment, Unocal contended that plaintiffs
provided no evidence that made their case actionable under the
Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 883.
28 U.S.C § 1330 (1993). See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp.
1 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a
foreign state enjoys general immunity from civil actions for damages unless the damages
occurred in the United States or the matter falls within one of FSIA’s enumerated
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping,
488 U.S. 428, 434-39 (1989) (holding that FSIA’s enumerated exceptions provide the only
mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state and its agencies or
instrumentalities). The FSIA is, therefore, often crucial to a plaintiff’s attempt to bring
not only a U.S. multinational corporation before the court, but also its foreign state
business partners as well.
13 Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 887.
14 Id. at 888.
15 Id. at 889.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 889.
Unlike similar ATCA cases in which the plaintiffs sought
environmental cleanup or other forms of equitable relief, the Doe plaintiffs sought “an
order directing defendants to cease payment to SLORC, and an order directing defendants
to cease their participation in the joint enterprise until the resulting human rights
violations in the Tenasserim region cease.” Id.
18 Id. at 891.
19 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. Summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1303 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). If the
moving party can show that there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to
return a verdict for the non-moving party, the case must be dismissed. Id.
11
12
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ATCA.20 For the ATCA to grant jurisdiction over a suit, the
defendant must either be a state actor, linked to state action, or
have committed one of the “handful” of jus cogens violations.21
A.

Requirement of State Action

After MOGE and SLORC were removed as defendants,
Unocal, the remaining defendant, could not reasonably be
considered a state actor.22 However, plaintiffs sought to prove
that the Burmese army’s actions were linked to Unocal’s will and
for Unocal’s benefit.23 To determine whether Unocal’s actions
could be considered “state action,” Judge Lew used two tests: the
joint action test,24 and the proximate cause test.25 Because the
joint action test is only appropriate in instances where the
private actor is accused of having committed the crime and is
aided by the state, he found it inapplicable.26
Instead, Judge Lew used the proximate cause test. To prove
proximate cause, a plaintiff must show that a non-state actor
exercised control over the government’s decision to commit a
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304. Jus Cogens violations are acts that are so heinous that, when
committed by any party, state or private, they violate “the law of nations.” Id. at 1303-04
(quoting 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1993)). Violations of the law of nations violate customary
international law, which governs the actions of both state and non-state actors. The
norms of customary international law emerge over time through widespread repetition by
the practice of states. Id. at 1304-05.
22 Id. at 1306-07.
23 Id. at 1303-10.
24 Id. at 1305. The Supreme Court first established the joint action test in Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). In a unanimous opinion written by Justice White, it noted
that to act “‘under color of’ state law . . . does not require that the defendant be an officer
of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or
its agents.” Id. at 27 (emphasis added). In Dennis, the defendant bribed a judge to obtain
an illegally issued injunction. The judge’s immunity from liability did not change the
character of his actions or that of his conspirators, who together jointly acted under color
of law in granting the injunction. Since the judge had immunity only because his act was
an official judicial action, the injunction must have been granted under color of law. Id. at
24.
Since Dennis, courts have varied in their application of the joint action test. To find
joint action, some courts require a conspiracy between the two parties. See Gallagher v.
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995). In the case of
Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that “[a] requirement of the joint action
charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.”
Other courts have simply required a more complicit state role to qualify as joint action.
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that “[j]oint action . . .
requires a substantial degree of cooperative action.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d
1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, in Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
the D.C. Circuit Court determined that “joint activity” requires, “at a minimum, some
overt and significant state participation in the challenged action.” (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
25 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
26 Id. at 1306-07.
20
21

ROSENCRANZ FINAL 05.18.05

2005]

Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable

6/21/2005 6:23 PM

134

violation.27 The proximate cause test first arose in Arnold v.
IBM.28 In Arnold, state officials searched the plaintiff’s property
with a warrant granted because of IBM’s withholding of specific
information regarding the allegations against him.29 He sued,
claiming that IBM’s actions were under color of law since IBM
was part of a conspiracy with state officials.30 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that proving proximate cause
requires more than action by the state.31 Although it was
undisputed that IBM was involved in the task force investigating
Arnold (it would not have existed but for IBM’s actions), no
evidence indicated that the defendants exerted control over the
decisions of the task force.32 The court therefore ruled that IBM’s
involvement with the task force did not proximately cause
Arnold’s injuries.33 In Brower v. County of Inyo, the court
specifically stated that for a complaint to sufficiently prove a
private party acted under color of law, “it must allege that
specific conduct by a party was a proximate cause” of the act.34
In considering Unocal’s motion, Judge Lew chose to interpret
proximate cause as the Ninth Circuit did in King v. Massarweh.35
There, the court cited Arnold in determining that “absent some
showing that a private party had some control over state officials’
decision” to commit the alleged act, “the private party did not
proximately cause the injuries stemming from [it].”36 Because
“[p]laintiffs present[ed] no evidence [alleging that] Unocal
‘controlled’ the Myanmar military’s decision to commit the
alleged tortious acts[,]” Judge Lew found that Unocal did not act
under “color of law” for purposes of the ATCA.37
In addition, plaintiffs claimed that a tort claim of forced
labor, an act akin to modern slavery, is actionable under the
ATCA regardless of whether the actor is a private individual or
acting under the “color of law.”38 Judge Lew agreed and
dismissed Unocal’s claims that the forced labor was more akin to
a public service requirement of limited duration.39
Id. at 1307.
637 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id. at 1357.
Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d at 1357.
817 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citing King v. Masserweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829
(9th Cir. 1986)).
36 King, 782 F.2d at 829.
37 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
38 Id.
39 Id.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
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Secondary Liability

Plaintiffs also had to prove “that Unocal [was] legally
responsible for the Myanmar [Burmese] military’s forced labor
practices.”40 Plaintiffs cited decisions during the U.S. Military
Tribunals after World War II as setting the precedent that the
knowledge and approval of slave labor practices by an
industrialist profiting from such actions is sufficient for a finding
The court disagreed and found that, under
of liability.41
international law, the vicarious liability of directors requires
participation and cooperation in the practice of forced labor.42
Although Judge Lew acknowledged that the evidence pointed to
Unocal’s knowledge of the forced labor practices, he dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims that Unocal could be held legally responsible for
the forced labor because none of the plaintiffs’ evidence suggested
Unocal actively sought to employ forced labor.43
The plaintiffs thereafter amended their suit. In Unocal II,
they invoked the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), which makes it illegal for organized criminal
conspiracies to operate legitimate businesses.44 Plaintiffs also
invoked federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133145 in
addition to filing under California state law.46 Again, Judge Lew
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.47
He declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims under California state
law, which, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), he could have done if all
federal claims are dismissed.48
Because Judge Lew found that no genuine issue of material
fact existed, he granted Unocal summary judgment and

Id. at 1309.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
(The Krupp Case), 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribs. Under
Control Council Law No. 10 (1950).
42 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
43 Id.
44 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003). Unocal believed that RICO could not be used
to hold corporations liable for acts committed extraterritorially. Unocal II, 110 F. Supp.
2d at 1310-11. Judge Lew agreed. Id. And because he found plaintiffs’ evidence of
“substantial acts in furtherance of the Project [that] occurred within the United States,”
he rejected their claim under RICO. Id. at 1311.
45 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1993). Plaintiffs argued that the law of nations is incorporated
into federal common law such that, under the federal question statute, the district court
would have jurisdiction over a violation of the law of nations. Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d
at 1311. Judge Lew found that plaintiffs’ claims lacked jurisdiction under the federal
question statute for the same reasons he found them lacking under the ATCA: plaintiffs
provided insufficient proof of Unocal’s direct or vicarious liability for the actions of the
Myanmar military. Id.
46 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
47 Id. at 1310-12.
48 Id. at 1311-12.
40
41
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dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.49 As the state
law claims were dismissed without ruling on them, both
plaintiffs appealed Judge Lew’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and re-filed the claims in California state
court.50 At this point, Doe v. Unocal split into two cases: one
federal and one state.
IV. DOE V. UNOCAL: UNOCAL’S NINTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT APPEAL
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit heard the plaintiffs’ appeal of summary judgment
in favor of Unocal.51 The panel agreed with the lower court’s
ruling that state agencies MOGE and SLORC were immune from
prosecution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.52
However, the court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Unocal and determined that a reasonable
fact finder could find genuine issues of material fact upon the
evidence submitted.53 Although all three judges found in favor of
the plaintiffs, Judge Stephen Reinhardt filed a concurring
opinion to Judge Harry Pregerson’s majority opinion.54
The majority disagreed with the lower court’s finding that no
evidence suggested that Unocal could be held accountable for the
actions of the Burmese military under the ATCA.55 The majority
cited Kadic v. Karadži , a Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruling in which the court found that certain crimes, such as rape,
torture and summary execution, while ordinarily requiring state
action under the ATCA, do not need to be committed under “color
of law” if done so in the furtherance of other more heinous
crimes, such as slave trading, genocide, or war crimes.56 These
crimes, known as jus cogens crimes, do not require state action
and are so egregious that they violate the law of nations
regardless of whether they are committed under “color of law.”57
Id. at 1312.
See Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Pl.’s Compl., Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
Nos. BC 237 980 & BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/statecomplaint2003.doc (last updated Oct. 15, 2004).
51 Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 936.
52 Id. at 958.
53 Id. at 962.
54 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
55 Id. at 947.
56 Id. at 945-46 (citing Kadic v. Karadži , 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995)).
57 The court in Kadic investigated whether other crimes committed by private
individuals could be jus cogens violations, under which the ATCA grants jurisdiction.
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241. The court looked at three crimes: genocide, war crimes, and
torture. Id. at 241-43. First, it determined that genocide is a crime applicable to private
non-state actors since the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 criminalizes
acts of genocide regardless of whether the perpetrator acts under color of law. Id. at 242
49
50
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The majority also reversed the lower court’s determination
that the plaintiffs provided insufficient evidence to prove “active
participation” on the part of Unocal, as was necessary during the
Nuremberg War Tribunals after World War II.58 The majority
noted that during the Nuremberg Tribunals, “active
participation” was only required to overcome the defendants’
“necessity defense.”59 Since Unocal did not, and could not, argue
necessity, plaintiffs did not need to prove “active participation.”60
The majority agreed to apply international law and
considered whether a private actor had to act “under color of
law.”61 Instead of looking solely at the Nuremberg trials, the
court found the two-pronged “aiding and abetting” test, actus
reus and mens rea, set by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda instructive.62 For actus reus, the court
relied on the ICTY’s ruling in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, which
found that actus reus “requires practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime.”63 The ICTY determined that
the acts of the accomplice must have had a “substantial [enough]
effect on the commission of the crime” that it would have been
unlikely to occur in “the same way [without] someone act[ing] in
the role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed.64

(citing Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1988)).
Second, considering war crimes, it found that they too granted jurisdiction because of the
long standing liability of private individuals committing war crimes. Id. at 242-43.
Finally, courts have recognized this liability since before World War I and reconfirmed it
at the Nuremberg Trials after World War II. Id. at 243.
Other courts have supported that a “handful of crimes” violate jus cogens norms. In
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Edwards supported the notion that although
most violations of the law of nations require state action for the ATCA to attach liability,
there are a “handful of crimes” that violate jus cogens norms and are actionable when
committed by non-state actors. 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., came to
the same conclusion, finding that courts have “universal jurisdiction” for such acts as
genocide, war crimes and terrorism. 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997). The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to disagree when it heard the case on appeal. See
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1999). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, also concluded that
certain crimes such as murder, genocide and slavery are all violations of jus cogens norms.
71 F.3d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1995).
58 Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 947-48.
59 Id. at 947.
60 Id. at 948.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 949-51.
63 Id. at 950.
64 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 112 I.L.R. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II May 7, 1997)).

ROSENCRANZ FINAL 05.18.05

2005]

Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable

6/21/2005 6:23 PM

138

For the mens rea, the court also relied upon the ICTY’s
decision in Furundzija. The tribunal found that mens rea is
fulfilled when the accomplice has reasonable knowledge that his
or her “actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of
the crime.”65 The tribunal said it was unnecessary for the
accomplice to know the precise nature of the crimes.66 The
accomplice need only know that one of a number of crimes would
likely be committed, and that the abettor would be facilitating
the commission of that crime.67 The accomplice does not have to
intend to commit the offense, but only have the knowledge that
he will be aiding and abetting it.68
The court determined that a reasonable fact finder could
conclude that Unocal’s conduct could meet the actus reus and the
mens rea requirements of aiding and abetting the Burmese
military’s actions.69 Evidence that Unocal provided practical
assistance to the military in subjecting plaintiffs to forced labor,
without which the perpetration of forced labor would likely not
have occurred, was sufficient for actus reus.70 For mens rea, the
court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Unocal’s
knowledge that forced labor was being used to the benefit of the
pipeline’s owners.71
The court found that there were genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether Unocal aided and abetted the forced labor
practices of the Burmese military.72 This holding, combined with
the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ other claims of rape and
murder did not need to be committed “under color of law” as long
as they were committed in furtherance of the forced labor,73
compelled the Ninth Circuit to overturn the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment for Unocal.74 The Ninth Circuit
declared that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence for
their case to move forward.75

65 Id. at 951 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317
(1999)).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 952.
70 Id. at 952.
71 Id. at 953.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 954 (quoting Kadic v. Karadži , 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995)).
74 Id. at 962-63 (reversing District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Unocal on plaintiff’s ATCA claims for forced labor, murder, and rape; affirming District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Unocal on plaintiff’s ATCA claims for
torture).
75 Id. at 962-63.
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Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt went a step
further and argued that it was unnecessary to apply
international criminal law standards of aiding and abetting.76
Instead, he asserted that “federal common law tort principles,
such as agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard,” were
entirely appropriate for ATCA cases.77 For the claims of forced
labor, Judge Reinhardt found it irrelevant whether forced labor
was a modern equivalent of slavery, and therefore a jus cogens
violation.78 Because plaintiffs were alleging that the Burmese
military committed the forced labor abuses, and that Unocal
should be held responsible under the theory of third-party
liability, it was unnecessary for them to prove that the alleged
abuses were jus cogens violations.79
Judge Reinhardt also looked more favorably on the plaintiffs’
claims of Unocal’s third-party liability. He determined that their
alleged complaints of joint venture, agency, and reckless
disregard are all common third-party liability theories in federal
common law, so federal common law – not international law –
should be applied to their claims.80
Under federal common law, the judge found that, for joint
venture liability, any member of the joint venture can be liable
for the torts of its co-venturers.81 Unocal argued that a separate,
independent corporation, Moattama Gas Transportation Co.
However,
(MGTC), oversaw construction of the pipeline.82
plaintiffs provided evidence to the contrary, including a Unocal
business manager stating that the appearance of two separate
entities was nothing but an illusion.83 Since the evidence
suggested that MGTC was part of the joint venture, and not a
separate corporation as Unocal contended, Judge Reinhardt
determined that the plaintiffs could proceed to trial on their joint
venture claim.84
For the agency liability claim, plaintiffs argued that Unocal
should be held liable for the Burmese military’s actions because
the military acted as its agent.85 Judge Reinhardt found
significant evidence that Unocal asserted control over aspects of
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 971-72.
Id.
Id. at 972.
Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 972.
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the military’s operations in relation to the construction of the
pipeline.86
Internal documents, memoranda by Unocal
executives, and public statements that Unocal had control over
the military all suggested that Unocal had control over aspects of
the military’s operations.87 This was sufficient evidence for
Judge Reinhardt to find that the plaintiffs’ claim that Unocal’s
control over aspects of the Burmese military’s actions, if proven,
would indicate a relationship of agency.88
Judge Reinhardt then considered the claim that Unocal was
liable for reckless disregard of the human rights abuses
committed by the Myanmar military in performing tasks related
Under his interpretation of
to the pipeline project.89
recklessness, proof of acting in conscious disregard to known
dangers, even without the proof of intent, is all that is necessary
Plaintiffs provided
to be considered reckless disregard.90
considerable evidence suggesting that Unocal knew of the likely
outcome of its involvement with the Myanmar military, including
meetings with human rights groups in which Unocal was
informed of the military’s brutal treatment of its people; a risk
management consulting firm’s report prior to Unocal’s joining the
project, suggesting that the risk of forced labor abuses in
connection with the project was high; and testimony from Unocal
executives acknowledging their concerns before entering into the
project, in particular the potential for human rights abuses.91
Judge Reinhardt found the evidence supporting the claim of
reckless disregard satisfactory for the plaintiffs to move to trial
with the claim.
Finally, Judge Reinhardt considered the plaintiffs’ claims of

86 Id. at 973.
Judge Reinhardt turned to the Supreme Court for guidance in
developing his agency argument:
The theory of agency liability is also well-supported in the federal common law.
The Supreme Court has observed in the context of the Copyright Act that
“when we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as employee,
employer, and scope of employment to be understood in light of agency law, we
have relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of
any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.”
Id. at 972 (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 973.
88 Id. at 974.
89 Id. at 974-76.
90 Id. at 975. Judge Reinhardt considered objective recklessness and subjective
recklessness. As to objective recklessness, he stated that the “Supreme Court has stated
that ‘[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty
to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or
so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. at 974 (citation omitted). Judge Reinhardt then
considered subjective recklessness, stating that “[t]his doctrine requires actual knowledge
of a substantial risk which the defendant subsequently disregards.” Id.
91 Id. at 976.
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Unocal’s liability for murder and rape.92 Once again, he agreed
with the majority that the plaintiffs could bring the claims to
trial, but disagreed with their reasoning.93 He determined that if
plaintiffs could prove the acts of murder and rape were
committed in furtherance of the forced labor program, and if they
could prove Unocal was liable for the forced labor practices of the
Burmese military, then it would again be unnecessary for them
to prove third party liability.94
FEDERAL DOE V. UNOCAL: NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANC ORDER

V.

After the three-judge panel’s ruling, Doe v. Unocal was ready
to go to a jury trial. However, on February 14, 2003, the Ninth
Circuit, upon a vote of the majority of non-recused judges on the
court, ordered that the case be reheard en banc.95 This order
vacated the previous three-judge panel ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs and held that the decision cannot be cited as precedent
in future cases.96 This was as far as the federal Doe v. Unocal
case went before the December 2004 settlement, although the en
banc panel was days away from hearing evidence when the
settlement aborted that process.
VI. STATE DOE V. UNOCAL: CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT
A.

Phase I

Because the plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the
California Constitution Article I § 6 and violation of the
California Business and Professions Code § 17200 were never
considered by the federal district court, plaintiffs re-filed these
claims in California state court.97 Phase I of the state trial
focused on “piercing the corporate veil:” Plaintiffs alleged that
Unocal was the alter ego of the subsidiaries that had contracted
with the Burmese government.98 The scope of Phase I was
limited to determining whether there was such a unity of interest
and ownership between Unocal and its subsidiary that the
individuality, or separateness between Unocal and its

Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 977.
Id.
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 978-79.
Id.
Pl.’s Compl., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/statecomplaint2003.doc.
98 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7,
2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/PlaintiffMSARuling.doc (Court order denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication)
92
93
94
95
96
97
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subsidiaries ceased to exist.99 The question was control: Did
Unocal have control over its subsidiaries’ actions? Superior Court
Judge Victoria Chaney found that it did not, and that Unocal’s
subsidiaries were not sham entities.100
B.

Phase II

Phase II of the trial discussed liability and damages.101
Unocal moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
factual findings in Phase I precluded going forward to Phase II
on the agency, control, joint enterprise and joint venture
theories.102 In Phase I of the trial, to pierce the corporate veil,
plaintiffs had to provide evidence to suggest that the parent
controlled the subsidiary sufficiently to deprive the subsidiary of
its independent personality.103 The court found that plaintiffs
did not show this.104 Unocal argued that because the court ruled
that Unocal did not control its subsidiary, it should not be held
liable for its subsidiary’s actions.105 The court disagreed: It found
no reason why a principal cannot be held liable for the
wrongdoing of its agent, committed in the scope of its agency,
merely because the agent is a distinct corporation.106 Judge
Chaney ruled that although the case was bound by the applicable
factual determinations made in Phase I, the question before the
court in Phase I was alter ego, not agency or joint venture.107
Thus, because both the burdens of proof and the claims made in
each phase of the trial were different, the finding of fact in Phase
I did not preclude a finding of fact in Phase II.108 Therefore, the
court found that the finding of fact in Phase I did not
automatically transfer to Phase II to resolve the issues of agency,
control, enterprise or joint venture.109 Judge Chaney denied

Id.
Doe v. Unocal (Oct. 15, 2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml
(stating that in the first phase of the trial, Judge Chaney concluded that the Unocal
subsidiaries involved in the Project are not sham entities).
101 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14,
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (Court order denying
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment).
102 Id.
103 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7,
2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/PlaintiffMSARuling.doc (Court order denying
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication)
104 Id.
105 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14,
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (Court order denying
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment).
106 Id. at 4.
107 Id. at 6-8.
108 Id.
109 Id.
99
100
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Unocal’s motion for summary judgment.110
VII. DOE V. UNOCAL SETTLEMENT
After Judge Chaney’s ruling, the next step for the Doe v.
Unocal state case was to empanel a jury to hear the case.
However, before this began, Unocal and the plaintiffs reached an
out-of-court settlement. In a joint-announcement made on
December 14, 2004, Unocal and EarthRights International, the
human rights group representing the Burmese plaintiffs,
announced that they had a reached a settlement that would end
both the state and federal cases against Unocal.111
Although EarthRights International declared it was
“thrilled” and “ecstatic” at the settlement, many questions were
unanswered regarding the ATCA’s applicability and Unocal’s
liability.112 Because of the en banc order from the Ninth Circuit,
the plaintiffs’ earlier victories in the Ninth Circuit cannot be
used as precedent for future cases. And because the settlement
prevents the case from being heard before the full en banc court,
no ruling will ever be issued on the merits of the plaintiffs’
claims.
VIII.

FUTURE ATCA CASES AGAINST CORPORATIONS

Although the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel’s rulings are
not legal precedent, they do suggest that the Alien Tort Claims
Act is a promising avenue for holding corporations liable for
international human rights violations. The Ninth Circuit ruling,
combined with the California Superior Court’s denial of Unocal’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on the vicarious liability claims,
seems to verify the ATCA’s ability to grant jurisdiction for
certain torts against U.S. corporations for their actions overseas.
These two cases were likely to set new precedents as to the
applicability of the ATCA.
A.

Aiding and Abetting

The three-judge Ninth Circuit ruling was voided by the en
banc order, but the ruling suggests that at least some of the
judges on the Ninth Circuit take an expansive view of the
jurisdiction granted by the ATCA. In applying the standards of
both the ICTY and the Nuremberg Tribunals, the court arrived
Doe v. Unocal, Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 8.
Jim Lobe, Foreign crimes come home to the US, ASIA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2004), at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FL16Ae01.html.
112 Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees Settlement with Burmese Villagers, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec.15, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/
0,,1373704,00.html.
110
111
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at lenient requirements for aiding and abetting.113 The actus
reus and mens rea tests are less restrictive than other tests used
in federal courts (such as the joint action and proximate cause
tests), though they are commonly used in international courts.114
B.

Judge Reinhardt’s Concurring Opinion

More promising for future plaintiffs was Judge Reinhardt’s
concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s overruling of the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Judge Reinhardt
found that plaintiffs did not need to produce international law
tests of liability to hold Unocal accountable.115 In using the
federal common law theories of joint venture liability, agency
liability, and reckless disregard liability, Reinhardt created more
viable ways for future plaintiffs to pursue corporations under the
ATCA.116 Even more promising is that he found the Burmese
plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence for all three theories of
liability.117
Judge Reinhardt’s concurring opinion on the plaintiffs’
burden to prove liability for violations that are not jus cogens
crimes is also more lenient. Reinhardt concluded that plaintiffs’
third party liability claims against Unocal do not need to be jus
cogens violations themselves, since they are actionable under
federal common law.118 It remains to be seen whether future
courts will agree with Judge Reinhardt’s reasoning.
C.

Vicarious Liability

In the state case, the California Superior Court rejected
Unocal’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Phase II.119 Judge
Chaney’s finding that under California law a principal can be
held liable for the acts of its agent, committed in the scope of its
agency, gives future plaintiffs firmer ground for holding
corporations liable for their subsidiaries’ and joint venturers’
actions.120 Going forward, corporations will have a stronger
burden to prove that they should not be held liable in any way for
their subsidiaries’ actions, even if they do not control the entire
subsidiary.
See Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 949-53.
Id.
Id. at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14,
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (denying Unocal’s
Motion for Summary Judgment).
120 Id. at 6.
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
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D. California Business and Professions Code § 17200
Judge Chaney’s rulings in the California state case also
suggested that the Doe v. Unocal plaintiffs could have shown, in
Phase II of the trial, that Unocal was unjustly enriched by the
human rights abuses of its pipeline project, and that its
involvement with the Burmese military amounted to an unfair
business practice under the California Business and Professions
Code § 17200.121
E.

Indispensable Parties

By setting aside Unocal’s argument that Burmese entities
were indispensable parties in both the state and federal cases,
the courts signaled to plaintiffs that corporations can be held
liable as third-party actors for violations committed overseas,
even if U.S. courts have no jurisdiction over the foreign party
committing the violations.122 Given the close relationships
between many corporations and foreign regimes in constructing
and operating projects that result in human rights abuses, this
ruling bolsters plaintiffs’ ability to pursue corporations for their
knowing participation in violating customary international law.
IX. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE ATCA: SOSA V. ALVAREZMACHAIN (2004)
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
questions relating to whether, and under what circumstances,
the ATCA creates a cause of action for plaintiffs to sue
corporations for violations of customary international law, it did
recently rule on the ATCA generally. In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,
the Court unanimously indicated that the ATCA creates a cause
of action in a “modest” number of cases involving clear
international law violations.123 Because it did not go into specific
causes of action, the Court did not settle the ongoing matter of
what claims, if any, are actionable under the ATCA. Harold Koh,
Dean of Yale Law School, and an expert on international law,
suggested that the ATCA probably still creates a cause of action
121 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 13-16 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun.
7, 2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/TortLiabilityMSARuling.doc (granting
Unocal’s Motions For Summary Adjudication as to the intentional torts and negligence
causes of action, but denying Unocal’s motion as to the California Business and
Professions Code § 17200).
122 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 889 (C.D. Cal. 1997); NCGUB v.
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237
980, BC 237 679, at 14-15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7, 2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/
unocal/VicariousLiabilityMSARuling.doc (denying Unocal Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on Absence of Vicarious Liability).
123 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2744 (2004).
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for torture, genocide, slavery, apartheid, and other widespread
and commonly accepted violations.124
It is unclear from Sosa whether corporations that “aid and
abet” repressive foreign governments with whom they do
business may be held liable under the ATCA. Outside of clearly
actionable causes, the Court’s ruling did not clarify just how
much discretion federal court judges have to find causes of action
under the ATCA. A 6-to-3 majority seemed to leave it up to
federal judges to decide (a) which international standards apply
in a case, and (b) whether the conduct in question violates those
standards under the ATCA.125 However, in his concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the federal judiciary “is
neither authorized nor suited to” make decisions on which
international law standards to apply and when certain conduct
violates them.126 In response to this, Justice Souter, joined by
Justices Stevens, O’Conner, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
suggested that as long as independent judicial recognition of
actionable international norms is conducted vigilantly, federal
judges may still have some discretion over finding causes of
action in customary international law.127 Thus, at least for now,
a narrow range of cases involving violations of jus cogens norms
are actionable under the ATCA, and federal judges may continue
to use limited discretion in adjudicating such cases.
X.

CONCLUSION

Both the state and the federal Doe v. Unocal cases were on
the verge of setting major new precedents for the liability of
American corporations for human rights abuses committed
abroad in which they aided and abetted or from which they
benefited. Although many of the plaintiffs’ arguments were
rejected, substantial portions of their case withstood multiple
motions for summary judgment by Unocal. Undoubtedly, Unocal
had cause for alarm. The Doe v. Unocal case also must have
frightened the Justice Department, as it filed amici curiae briefs
on Unocal’s behalf throughout the lawsuit.128 As one journalist
observed, “Unocal . . . probably calculated that the bad publicity
they would face in a trial is worse than the high cost of settling
the claim.”129
124 Warren Richey, Ruling Makes It Harder for Foreigners to Sue in US Courts,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 30, 2004, at 3.
125 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-70.
126 Id. at 2769-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
127 Id. at 2764.
128 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae United States, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
129 Campbell, supra note 112.
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The suggestions of aiding and abetting, vicarious liability,
and unjust enrichment seemed ripe for adjudication. It was quite
probably a sound business decision on Unocal’s part to settle both
cases before risking the establishment of such powerful
precedents. In view of the federal judges’ various rulings in the
Doe v. Unocal lawsuit, future plaintiffs seem on firm ground for
pursuing corporations in federal court under the ATCA for their
human rights abuses committed abroad. Such plaintiffs may
have even greater success pursuing comparable state claims
based on state constitutional and statutory provisions forbidding
forced labor, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment.

